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COMMENTS
CONFLICT OF LAWS-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT AS APPLIED TO
STATUTES-While the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution1
makes no apparent distinction between judgments and public acts, it is
clear that statutes have not been afforded the same degree of full faith
and credit as judgments.2 Whether or not a statute will receive full
faith and credit has been questionable in most cases, and serious problems of prediction still arise. The recent cases of Hughes v. Fetter2 and
First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, Inc. 4 illustrate
some of the problems in the :field as well as what may be the Supreme
Court's present position on this question. In the former case, the plainU.S. Const., art. IV, §1.
See GooDRICH, CoNFLICTS OF LAws, 3d ed., §§208-218 (1949); 2 BEALE, CoNFLICTS
LAws §446.1 (1935).
a 341 U.S. 609, 71 S.Ct. 980 (1951).
4 342 U.S. 396, 72 S.Ct. 421 (1952).
1
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tiff, whose decedent was fatally injured in Illinois, brought an action
under the Illinois wrongful death act:5 in the Wisconsin courts. The
action was dismissed on the grounds that a similar action provided by
Wisconsin statute6 was limited to deaths occurring in Wisconsin, indicating a local public policy against entertaining suits for deaths occurring out of the state. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed,7 but the
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Wisconsin
public policy must give way before the full faith and credit requirement.
In the latter case, plaintiff's decedent was killed in an airplane crash in
Utah, and recovery was sought in the federal courts in Illinois under
the wrongful death act of Utah. Defendant interposed section 2 of the
Illinois wrongful death act,8 which stated that no suit should be maintained in the Illinois courts if the death occurred outside the state and
service of summons was obtainable there, and argued that the federal
courts were bound to observe the state policy in diversity cases under
the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins. 9 The district court dismissed
the action, and the court of appeals affirmed. 10 However, the Supreme
Court reversed, again holding that the policy barring foreign actions
must fall before the full faith and credit requirement, basing its opinion
in large part on the similar holding in Hughes v. Fetter. It is interesting to note that of the four Justices dissenting in Hughes v. Fetter, 11
only two dissented in this case.12 The other two joined in a concurring
opinion, supporting the result upon different grounds.
It is clear in both cases that if plaintiff had £rst reduced his claim
to judgment in the state where the death occurred, other states would
have been bound to enforce it regardless of any local public policy to
the contrary.13 The public policy exception to the full faith and credit
clause as it applies to statutes lies at the root of this difference in treatment, and is a concept difficult of specific application.

I. Development of Full Faith and Credit as Applied to Statutes
It seems clear that the full faith and credit clause was not intended
to have general application to statutes at the time the Constitution was
5 ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 70, §§1, 2.
6Wis. Stat. (1949) §331.03.
7 257 Wis. 35, 42 N.W. (2d) 452 (1950).

sill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 70, §2.
9 340 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938).
10 (7th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 493.
11 Frankfurter, Reed, Jackson, and Minton.
12 Frankfurter and Reed.13 See note 2 supra.
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adopted. The provision for public acts was added to a similar clause in
the Articles of Confederation to provide for a few limited instances,
such as legislative decrees of insolvency and divorce.14 This interpretation of the clause was reflected in the subsequent legislation implementing the constitutional provision.15 The same interpretation continued
until quite recently, and the application of sister state statutes was based
upon other theories, notably, due process.16 In tracing the rise of full
faith and credit as a basis for compulsory application of the law of a
sister state, it seems most profitable to group the cases according to their
subject matter rather than by strict chronology.
In the area of workmen's compensation, the first case considering
the application of full faith and credit to a sister state statute was Bradford Electric Co. 11. Clapper.17 Although properly laid under New
Hampshire law, that state's courts were required to dismiss the action
because it contravened the terms of the Vermont statute, which was
held to control. Vermont was the domicile of both the employer and
employee, and the contract of employment was made there. The employment was usually carried on in Vermont. New Hampshire's sole
connection with the action was that the injury occurred there. Justice
Stone concurred in the result but objected to the compulsory aspect of
full faith and credit. He felt that the full faith and credit clause "should
be interpreted as leaving the courts of New Hampshire free, in the
circumstances now presented, either to apply or refuse to apply the law
of Vermont, in accordance with their own interpretation of New Hampshire policy and law." 18 Justice Brandeis, writing the majority opinion,
stated that full faith and credit did not require the enforcement of every
right arising by virtue of foreign statute, since some accommodation of
local policies should be granted.19
In the second case in this field, Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial
Accident Commission, 20 the court at the forum was allowed to apply its
own statute. This suit was brought under the California workmen's
compensation act, and was defended on the grounds that the injury
occurred in Alaska, and the contract of employment made the Alaska
statute applicable. Justice Stone, writing the Court's opinion, seized
14 See 2 FARRAND, THE REconns OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION 447 (1911).
151 Stat. L. 122, c. 11 (1790), 28 U.S.C. (1940) §687.
16 Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171, 37 S.Ct. 34 (1916); New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 38 S.Ct. 415 (1918).
17286 U.S. 145, 52 S.Ct. 571 (1932).
1s Id. at 164-165.
19 Id. at 160.
20 294 U.S. 532, 55 S.Ct. 518 (1935).
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upon the public policy exception to full faith and credit, recognized but
not applied in the Bradford case, and held that the policy considerations
of California were strong enough to preclude application of the full
faith and credit clause. Several factual differences from the Bradford
case seem to warrant this result: the injured claimant worked in Alaska
only temporarily and had returned to California, and the California act
stated that it was to be an exclusive remedy. 21 In addition, the Court
mentioned the very small likelihood that the claimant would in fact be
able to bring an action in Alaska, and seemed to feel that the employer
had taken advantage of him by making the Alaska statute applicable.
In spite of the factual differences, the language of the opinion made
it clear that public policy had come into its own as a basis for denying
full faith and credit to a sister state statute.

Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission22 held that California could apply its own workmen's compensation
law where the Massachusetts act was offered as a defense to the action.
The injured employee and the employer were residents of Massachusetts, the contract was made in Massachusetts, and the law of Massachusetts was designed as an exclusive remedy. The empl9yee was in
California on a temporary assignment. Nevertheless, California's public policy considerations were held weighty enough to prevent enforcement of the Massachusetts law. The factor giving rise to this result
was said to be the interest of California in assuring payment to its residents who rendered services to the employee after his injury. It is
interesting to note that this case reaches a result opposite to the Bradford case on very similar facts. The only substantial difference is that
in the Bradford case the employee died, while here the employee lived
and was cared for in California.
In contrast to the divergent results in workmen's compensation
cases, stockholders' or members' liability is uniformly governed by the
laws of the state of incorporation. In these cases, the Court has, without exception, held that full faith and credit must be applied. As early
as 1912 it was said that the subject of stockholders' liability is so within
the regulatory powers of the state of incorporation that no other state
can have a policy on it.23 This statement appeared again in Broderick
11. Rosner,24 twenty-three years later, when it was held that New Jersey
21 "No contract, rule or regulation shall exempt the employer from liability for the
compensation fixed by this act. •.•" Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1931) Act 4749, §27a.
22 306 U.S. 493, 59 S.Ct. 629 (1939).
23 Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 32 S.Ct. 415 (1912).
24 294 U.S. 629, 55 S.Ct. 589 (1935).
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could not, by means of a procedural requirement impossible of fulfillment, close its courts to suits involving stockholder liability arising
under the laws of New York. Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express2 5 might
appear to deviate from this pattern, since Georgia refused to enforce an
assessment made by a New York mutual insurance company against its
citizens. The actual holding in that case, however, was that the Georgia
defendants were not members of the society as the contract of insurance
was interpreted by Georgia courts, and that Georgia was competent to
interpret the contract. · There is dictum to the effect that if the fact of
membership had been found, full faith and credit would have been
given.20
Fraternal benefit societies are likewise treated in a consistent manner, and the law of the state of incorporation is held to govern in cases
of conllict. A recent case, Order of United Commercial Travelers v.
W olfe,21 held that South Dakota must apply a statute of Ohio which
allowed a fraternal benefit society to limit the time in which claims
might be brought, despite the fact that a statute of South Dakota made
such a provision void. The contract was made in South Dakota, and the
deceased died in that state. Application of the laws of the state of
incorporation is particularly striking in this case, as it is contrary to the
usual rule that the law where the contract was made or is to be performed should govern.28
In the field of commercial insurance there seems to be no such uniformity as is found in the treatment of fraternal benefit societies. The
Court has been unwilling to extend its recognition of the need for uniformity in cases involving fraternal benefit societies29 to the commercial
insurance cases. Thus Griffen v. McCoach30 held that a beneficiary
who had no insurable interest under Texas law could not recover on a
policy, although payment was permitted by New York statute, the contract was made in New York, and the contesting beneficiaries were not
residents of Texas. However, the Court in John Hancock Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Yates31 required Georgia to give effect to a parol evidence
statute which prevented recovery upon an insurance contract made in
25 314 U.S. 201,
20 Id. at 207.
21 331 U.S. 586,

62 S.Ct. 241 (1941).

67 S.Ct. 1335 (1947).
See also Sovereign Camp v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66, 59 S.Ct. 35 (1938); Modem
Woodmen v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 45 S.Ct. 389 (1925); Supreme Council of Royal
Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531, 35 S.Ct. 724 (1915).
29 See Order of Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 67 S.Ct. 1335 (1947);
Modem Woodmen v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 45 S.Ct. 389 (1925).
30 313 U.S. 498, 61 S.Ct. 1023 (1941).
31299 U.S. 178, 57 S.Ct. 129 (1936).
28
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New York. This case seems to be the usual result when an attempt is
made to extend the liability of the insurer beyond the limits of its
contract as construed under the lex loci. Although the Yates case deals
with the problem in terms of full faith and credit, several earlier cases
reached a similar result on· the basis of due process.32
The £.nal area in which full faith and credit has been considered,
i.e., wrongful death actions, is illustrated by Hughes 11. Fetter, and First
National Bank of Chicago 11. United Air Lines, Inc., discussed earlier.
These two cases hold that a court is required to entertain a wrongful
death action arising under a sister state statute, even though the state's
own wrongful death act indicates a contrary policy. This position might
follow from much earlier decisions33 tending in this direction. These,
however, were not decided in terms of full faith and credit, but were
based on the transitory nature of what is essentially a tort action.

II. Evaluation of Present Position
Various explanations might be ventured to clarify the present situation, one of which is the influence of Chief Justice Stone. It was he
who expressed disagreement with the compulsory aspect of full faith
and credit as set forth in the Bradford case, and established the public
policy exception in the Alaska Packers decision. Griffen v. McCoach
and Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, both denying full faith and
credit, were the last decisions in which he participated. No similar consistency is found on the part of'the other Justices. All of the majority
in Order of Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe heard Hughes v. Fetter.
Both cases were £.ve to four decisions upholding full faith and credit.
However, only two of these Justices were in the majority in the latter
case, while three joined the dissenters. Thus of the seven Justices hearing both cases, only two felt that full faith and credit should be required in both instances.
The "inconsistency" of the individual Justices described above emphasizes the value of a subject matter analysis, for the alignment in the
Hughes case was followed in First National Bank of Chicago 11. United
Air Lines, Inc., on the issue of the applicability of full faith and credit.
Both of these cases dealt with the question of whether full faith and
credit required the court at the forum to entertain a wrongful death
32

See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 50 S.Ct. 338 (1930); Hartford Accident

& Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 54 S.Ct. 634 (1934).
33

Stewart v. B. & O. R.R. Co., 168 U.S. 445, 18 S.Ct. 105 (1897); Atchison, Topeka

& Santa Fe R. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55, 29 S.Ct. 397 (1909).
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action arising under a sister state statute, and the entire Court responded
in the same way both times. Thus it would seem that a fairly reliable
prediction could be made in this area, as long as the Court's composition
remains the same. However, the Court has rendered decisions on the
full faith and credit requirement in only a few areas. Therefore, the
main value of a classification based upon the subject matter of the cases
would seem to lie in the possibility that it can serve as a basis for prediction in an area not yet decided. It is submitted that this possibility
exists if one accepts the premise that the conB.icting policy considerations and interests of the states tend to be the same in repeated situations of a given nature. Thus it may be possible to extract particular
policy conB.icts from the decided cases and predict the result where the
same or a similar conB.ict arises in a hitherto undecided area. It must
be remembered that the paucity of decided cases restricts the usefulness
of this technique of analysis. Nevertheless, it is not without value, as
a few examples will show. Applying the policy conB.icts and the known
result in the wrongful death cases, it could be expected that a state
would have to entertain a statutory action, other than for wrongful
death, which arose in another state, where the state of the forum has a
comparable statute, limited by its terms to actions arising in the state.
The exclusionary policy would fall before the stronger policy of enforcing a valid right regardless of where it arises. 34 However, it must not
be assumed that the policy of the forum is ignored, for if the action
were based upon a wagering contract, valid where made but illegal in
the state of the forum, an opposite result might well be reached.
The application of this suggested approach becomes more difficult
in an area, such as the workmen's compensation cases, where the results
are not uniform. As will be remembered, the Court has held both ways
on the applicability of full faith and credit in these cases. However, an
investigation of the factual situations in those cases indicates that the
state in which the employee is injured and treated,3 5 or in which he is
liable to remain following his injury3 6 has a sufficiently strong interest
to warrant denial of- full faith and credit to a conB.icting statute. The
Bradford case, in which full faith and credit was required although the
84 Stated in Milwaukee County v. White, 296 U.S. 268 at 277, 56 S.Ct. 229 (1935),
that the full faith and credit clause was designed to make "a single nation throughout
which a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right, irrespective of the
state of its origin."
85 As in Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493,
59 S.Ct. 629 (1939).
36 As in Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.S. 532, 55
S.Ct. 518 (1935).
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injury occurred in the state of the forum, is not inconsistent with this
statement; in that case the injured employee died. On the other hand,
the fact that the conflicting statute provides an exclusive remedy, or
that the statute is made applicable by the contract of employment, has
been held only secondary in an assessment of the state's relative interests. Thus, even in this area, it is possible to find specific interests of
the state which will outweigh other particular relationships when a
conflict arises, and predict the result whenever this or a similar conflict
appears.

III. Conclusion
In the present state of the law, all that can be said with any basis
in the decided cases is that full faith and credit is required in cases of
wrongful death actions, stockholders' liability, and fraternal benefit
societies, but will not be automatically applied in workmen's compensation cases. It seems certain, however, that the doctrine of full faith
and credit as applied to statutes will have a much wider impact in the
future.
The starting point in an attempt to assess this future impact should
be the constitutional provision giving rise to the full faith and credit
requirement. However, even a cursory study of the cases indicates that
this provision cannot be interpreted literally, but rather, must be read
in the light of its application through the years. The serious difficulties
of prediction discussed above are therefore increased, if anything, by a
reference to the basic statement of the rule.
As has been seen, statutes were not considered proper subjects for
full faith and credit to any extent until quite rec;ently. Therefore, it
might be said that the constitutional provision, as it applies to statutes,
operates not as a rule but as an exception to another rule which might
be loosely stated as the power of a state to apply its own laws. The
method by which this exception to state autonomy is applied is a consideration of the relative interests of the conflicting states, and application of the law of that state whose interests are weightier. It is submitted that this approach will govern future decisions on this subject, and
that one seeking enforcement of a foreign statute will be required to
show why that law, rather than the law of the forum, should govern.37
37 "Prima facie every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its own statutes.•••
One who challenges that right, because of the force given to a confficting statute of another
state by the full faith and credit clause, assumes the burden of showing • • • that of the
confilcting interests involved those of the foreign state are superior to those of the forum."
Justice Stone in Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.S. 532 at
547, 55 S.Ct. 518 (1935).
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The cases indicate that the decision as to which law will govern will
be stated in terms of con:8icting policies and interests. That these considerations are the basis of such a decision should not be startling; they
have a venerable position in the concept of applying foreign law by
comity. The real significance of the recent cases applying full faith and
credit to statutes seems to lie not in their consideration of policy factors,
but rather in taking the final choice out of the hands of the state courts.
State courts are no longer free, as they once were,38 to apply or not to
apply the law of another state as they may choose, subject only to the
restrictions of due process. The optional character of interstate comity
disappears if the Supreme Court finds the sister state statute supported
by stronger policy interests. Occasional statements to the contrary notwithstanding,39 it now seems that the Supreme Court chooses between
the con:8icting policies and decides which law will be enforced.40 In
other words, a constitutional obligation now exists on the part of each
state, requiring that full faith and credit be given a sister state statute,
if the Supreme Court finds such a result warranted by its assessment
of the conflicting policies and interests in the particular case.41

George D. Miller, Jr., S.Ed. *

38 K:cyger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171 at 176, 37 S.Ct. 34 (1916), states that choice of
law by a state court is " ••• purely a question of local common law, '[and] is a matter with
which this court is not concerned."
3 9 See Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 at 507, 61 S.Ct. 1023 (1941), and the
dissent in Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 at 620, 71 S.Ct. 980 (1951).
40 As stated in the majority opinion in Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 at 611, " •..
it is for this Court to choose in each case between the competing public policies involved."
41 The tendency to make enforcement of sister state statutes compulsory in some
instances is illustrated by the revision of the Judicial Code including "public acts" in the
legislation implementing the constitutional provision. 28 U.S.C. (1948) §1738. While this
change has not been the basis of any decision as yet, it might be indicative of a trend
toward such enforcement.
* The writer is indebted to John J. Edman, S.Ed. for much of the preliminary research
used in this comment.

